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Abstract 
In 2003, Swiss Re introduced a mortality-based security designed to hedge excessive 
mortality changes for its life book of business.  The concern was apparently brevity risk, 
i.e., the risk of premature death.  The brevity risk due to a pandemic is similar to the 
property risk associated with catastrophic events such as earthquakes and hurricanes 
and the security used to hedge the risk is similar to a CAT bond. This work looks at the 
incentives associated with insurance-linked securities. It considers the trade-offs an 
insurer or reinsurer faces in selecting a hedging strategy. We compare index and 
indemnity-based hedging as alternative design choices and ask which is capable of 
creating the greater value for shareholders. Additionally, we model an insurer or 
reinsurer that is subject to insolvency risk, which creates an incentive problem known as 
the judgment proof problem. The corporate manager is assumed to act in the interests of 
shareholders and so the judgment proof problem yields a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Given the fact that hedging may improve the 
situation, the analysis addresses what type of hedging tool would be best to use. We show 
that an indemnity-based security tends to worsen the situation, as it introduces an 
additional incentive problem. Index-based hedging, on the other hand, under certain 
conditions turns out to be beneficial and therefore clearly dominates indemnity-based 
strategies. This result is further supported by showing that for the same strike prices the 
current shareholder value is greater with the index-based security than the indemnity-
based security. 
Keywords: alternative risk transfer, insurance, default risk 
JEL classification: G22, G32, D82 
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Introduction 
As populations grow and change, markets integrate and medical science advances, the 
character and structure of the risks faced by governments, corporations and individuals 
also change.  The threat of SARS in 2003 and avian flu in 2004 have provided reminders 
that governments and life insurers face correlated risks on a large scale in events such as 
pandemics.   
In December 2003, Swiss Re introduced a mortality-based security designed to hedge 
excessive mortality changes for its life book of business.1  The concern was apparently 
brevity risk, i.e., the risk of premature death.  Brevity risk can be managed with the 
standard tools as long as there are no correlated mortality surprises.  Such would be the 
case with a recurrence of the Spanish flu or more generally with the occurrence of a new 
avian flu.  The potential for pandemics introduces correlated risks on a large scale and so 
the potential for mortality surprises. The brevity risk due to a pandemic is similar to the 
property risk associated with catastrophic events such as earthquakes and hurricanes 
and the security used to hedge the risk is similar to a CAT bond (Dubinsky and Laster 
2003). 
The model constructed here is designed to analyze the potential usefulness of mortality-
based securities in hedging risk.  A publicly held and traded corporation with books of life 
business is constructed.  The corporation may be an insurer or reinsurer, although it will 
be referred to as a reinsurer throughout most of this article.  The organization is 
structured so that it faces brevity risk in addition to other standard risks such as credit 
and interest rate risk.  Under these conditions, a (re)insurer facing a capital constraint 
may find a mortality-based security to be a natural risk management tool and therefore 
turn to the capital markets to hedge these risks. It may also traditionally reinsure its 
book of business.  The model employed here is sufficiently general to allow for both types 
of instruments to be considered. The focus, however, is aimed at highlighting a design 
choice that is particularly important in catastrophe bond issues; the question is whether 
an index or indemnity trigger is used as the underlying for such a transaction. 
The literature on Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) explains how the securitization of 
catastrophic exposures can create value.  Some articles have identified the trade-offs 
involved in the design of optimal risk management programs integrating traditional 
(re)insurance and ART instruments (Doherty 1997; Froot 1997; Croson and Kunreuther 
2000).  On the one hand, securitization of insurance risk offers advantages over 
traditional reinsurance arrangements, such as the potential to substantially reduce moral 
hazard, credit risk and transaction costs.  On the other hand, possible improvements 
typically come at a cost of the basis risk incurred by an index-linked transaction; this is 
true since an index cannot perfectly represent the individual risk and would therefore 
only provide an imperfect hedge.  
This recent literature focuses on transactions based upon index triggers.  This approach 
seems justified in light of empirical observations in the CAT bond market:  While earlier 
CAT bond issues were mainly based upon indemnity triggers (which have also 
traditionally been used in insurance and reinsurance coverage), the last few years 
indicate a greater market share for indexed instruments (McGhee, Faust and Clarke 
2005).2  As index-based solutions create the problem of basis risk, their recent popularity 
1 A similar mortality-based instrument was introduced by Swiss Re in April 2005.  See Artemis – the 
alternative risk transfer portal. 
2 A recent study by Guy Carpenter & Company (Guy Carpenter 2005), for instance identifies new risk capital in 
the amount of $915.3 million ($1.47 billion) that was provided through index-linked CAT bonds in 2004 (2003), 
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naturally raises the question of why the industry prefers index over indemnity triggers.  
The straightforward answer is that, besides potentially reducing transaction cost, an 
appropriately constructed index reduces or eliminates moral hazard.  The introduction of 
a catastrophe index in a CAT bond issue or the use of a population’s average life 
expectancy in a mortality-based security solve the moral hazard problem inherent in 
almost any insurance or reinsurance transaction. 
An index trigger is a new device for addressing moral hazard. If compensation from a 
reinsurance contract or any other hedging instrument is based upon an index beyond the 
hedging party’s control, this party will still reap the entire benefit of loss control in 
addition to the hedge.  The other party, e.g. a reinsurer or the investors in an insurance-
linked security, do not need to be concerned anymore about monitoring the cedent’s, 
respectively the issuer’s, risk selection or loss-handling practices.  A trade-off results 
between these benefits and the basis risk incurred by the index instrument. 
A few papers have addressed the trade-offs analytically: Cummins and Mahul (Cummins 
and Mahul 2000) consider an insurance product that is subject to credit risk as well as 
basis risk,3 as the insurer’s payment is tied to an exogenous index.  The interaction 
between these two factors is also analysed by Richter (Richter 2003) albeit with two 
different instruments:  Insurance, on the one hand, is subject to credit risk but can be 
used to generate a perfect hedge.  Risk securitization, on the other hand, comes without 
credit risk but incurs basis risk.  The analysis shows that under these conditions the 
indexed security is beneficial whenever the credit risk on the reinsurance exists.  As a 
tool that mainly counteracts reinsurance credit risk, securitization primarily replaces 
reinsurance for high levels of the loss.  The latter result is confirmed by Nell and Richter 
(Nell and Richter 2004) who study the trade-off between the implicit transaction cost 
incurred by a reinsurer’s risk aversion and the basis risk of a CAT bond.  
The trade-off between moral hazard and basis risk has been discussed analytically by 
Doherty and Mahul (Doherty and Mahul 2001) and Doherty and Richter (Doherty and 
Richter 2002), who investigate the interaction of these two problems, when insurance can 
be used to cover the basis risk of an index-linked transaction.  It is shown that combining 
the two hedging tools might extend the possibility set and therefore lead to efficiency 
gains.   
This work will consider the trade-offs an insurer or reinsurer faces in selecting a hedging 
strategy to maximize current shareholder value.  Like Doherty and Mahul and Doherty 
and Richter we consider index and indemnity triggers; the focus here, however, is on a 
publicly held and traded corporation acting in the interests of shareholders rather than a 
manager maximizing expected utility.   Rather than considering a mix of hedging 
instruments, we compare index and indemnity-based hedging as alternative design 
choices and ask which is capable of creating the greater value for shareholders.  
Additionally, and very importantly, we model an insurer or reinsurer that is subject to 
insolvency risk; this risk of insolvency creates an additional incentive problem known as 
the judgment proof problem.  The corporate manager is assumed to act in the interests of 
shareholders and so the judgment proof problem yields a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  The judgment proof problem then yields a situation 
in which management does not have an incentive to select the socially optimal level of 
care.   
while new indemnity-based transactions only amounted to 227.5 (260) million. Contrasting this, indemnity-
based transactions in 1998 (1997) amounted to $846.1 ($431) million while index-based CAT bonds generated 
risk capital in the amount of $0 ($202 million).  
3 We refer to one of the risks as credit rather than default risk since the organization that is the object of 
analysis is not subject to default but rather owns a contract that is subject to default.  The recently published 
version of (Cummins and Mahul 2004), however, does not include the basis risk. 
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A solution for the underinvestment problem suggested in the risk management literature 
is that potential creditors demand that the corporation hedges insolvency risk, e.g., 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith and Stulz 1985; Mayers and Smith 1987; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein 1993; Garven and MacMinn 1993; MacMinn 2005). This 
requirement can be enforced, for instance, by adding a covenant to the debt that requires 
the company to hedge.  Given the fact that hedging improves the situation, the following 
analysis will address, in light of the new financial instruments described above, what 
type of hedging tool would be best to use. We ask whether one of the two types of hedging 
that were discussed earlier is better than the other as a solution for the incentive 
distortions created by insolvency risk.  Thus, the primary interest here is in the 
incentives associated with index versus indemnity-based insurance-linked securities (or 
other forms of hedging) in a framework in which the issuer faces the risk of insolvency.  
We consider the impact such securities have on the company’s actions, e.g., regarding 
underwriting.   
The analysis here extends previous work by incorporating basis risk and moral hazard in 
modeling an insurer or reinsurer facing insolvency risk on its books of business.  In a 
financial market setting, we show that an indemnity-based security tends to worsen the 
situation, as it introduces the additional incentive problem.  Index-based hedging, on the 
other hand, under certain conditions turns out to be beneficial and therefore clearly 
dominates indemnity-based strategies.  This result is further supported by showing that 
for the same strike prices the current shareholder value is greater with the index-based 
security than the indemnity-based security. 
The financial market model with a life reinsurer’s brevity risk is introduced in the next 
section.  The socially efficient operating decisions are also derived here.  The following 
section on triggers and incentives introduces the indemnity and index instruments; there 
the incentive effects of each are analyzed.  The penultimate section compares the current 
shareholder values for the indemnity and index triggers given the same strike prices on 
those options. 
 
A Financial Market Model with Brevity and Insolvency Risk 
Consider an organization in a competitive economy operating between the dates t = 0 and 
1 (MacMinn 1987).  The dates t = 0 and 1 are subsequently referred to as now and then, 
respectively.  Decisions are made now and payoffs on those decisions are received then.  
The economy is composed of organizations and risk averse investors.  Investors make 
portfolio decisions on personal account to maximize expected utility subject to a budget 
constraint.  The organization will initially take the corporate form and will be assumed to 
act on behalf of its principals, i.e., the investors who are shareholders.4
In a standard reinsurance transaction the profitability of a contract depends on the 
cedent’s loss control effort or equivalently the level of care.  A (re)insurer selects a 
portfolio of risks and negotiates the contract terms with the insured.  This includes 
required safety and loss reduction operations as well as aspects of product design such as 
deductibles, retention levels or coinsurance arrangements. When claims arise, a primary 
settles those claims with its policyholders. Each of these activities and considerations is 
costly, yet each activity can affect the frequency and severity of claims. If a primary is 
heavily reinsured or if a reinsurer is covered by a significant retrocession, it still bears 
the cost of loss reduction, but the other contracting party reaps the benefit. To address 
4 The assumption is only for convenience.  The corporate objective function can be derived; for example, see 
MacMinn (2005).  
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this incentive conflict, reinsurance has contractual controls.  Contracts may be experience 
rated or retrospectively priced.  Additionally, long term and brokered relationships are 
common in reinsurance which provide further incentive to undertake loss control.  We 
abstract from the plethora of methods available to the reinsurer to manage its risks and 
focus on a single activity we call the level of care and suppose that increasing the level of 
care reduces risk.   
The insurance company considered will face the standard capital market risks such as 
interest rate and insolvency risks but will also face life risk.  The premium income will be 
generated now and invested in a capital market portfolio.  The composition of the 
organization’s portfolio will be determined endogenously and will be shown to depend on 
the risk management choices made.  The losses on the books of business occur then and 
depend on the state of nature revealed.  The following partially summarizes the notation 
used in the development of the model: 
 
ω state of nature 
Ω = ζ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦0,  set of states 
p(ω) basis stock price now 
P(ω) 
 sum of basis stock prices ε ≤  ω; 
ω
ω = ε ε∫0P( ) p( )d  
Γ(ω) premium income then on the book of business; 0′Γ > 5
a effort spent in composing the book of business measured in dollars 
( )ωL a,  loss on book of business 
( )Π ωa,  payoff on book of business, i.e., ( ) ( )a, ( ) L a, aΠ ω = Γ ω − ω −  
I(ω) mortality index 
i exercise price for mortality security 
S stock value 
  
                                                     
5 As the economy improves in state so does the premium income then since the premium income is invested. 
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Suppose the financial markets are competitive.  In the absence of any insurance-linked 
security and any insolvency risk, the stock market value of the (re)insurer may be 
expressed as the value of its books of business as follows: 
  (1) { }
0
S(a) max 0, dP dP
ζ
Ω= Π =∫
Consider the reinsurer.  The reinsurer has the payoff max{0, Π} in the absence of the 
mortality-based security.  The reinsurer may create a mortality-based security for its life 
book by forming a special purpose entity (SPE) similar to that for a CAT bond; the 
essence of the security from the perspective of the insurer, however, is the creation of an 
option that yields a payoff of L(a, ω) dollars in state ω for losses on its life book in excess 
of a trigger amount i; equivalently, the security pays { ( ) }0, L a, imax ω − .  This is the case 
if the reinsurer uses an indemnity trigger.  Alternatively, if the reinsurer uses an index 
trigger then the essence of the SPE is the creation of a security that yields an indexed 
payoff of I(ω) in state ω for losses on its life book in excess of a trigger amount i; 
equivalently, the index security pays { ( ) }max 0, I iω −  
In an economy such as this the 1958 Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller 
1958) will hold and so mortality-based securities will not, ceteris paribus, increase the 
stock value of the (re)insurer.  Once the ceteris paribus assumption is relaxed we will 
investigate the incentive effects of the mortality-based securities and ultimately the 
impact on value.  Additionally, by adding longevity risk and a similar mortality-based 
security for life annuity books of business, the natural hedge between the (re)insurer's life 
and annuity books of business might be investigated.   
From the reinsurer’s perspective the life book of business exposes the corporation to the 
risk that an insured’s life is briefer than expected and so we refer to it as brevity risk.  
The reinsurer may also be exposed to insolvency risk and credit risk in the financial 
markets; the insolvency risk introduces the judgment proof problem with the associated 
incentive problems.  The ability to securitize some risk in capital markets introduces a 
moral hazard problem in the underwriting operation.  In this section we concentrate on 
the life book of business and the associated risks.   
First, consider the value of the reinsurer with and without the mortality-based security; 
we will refer to the mortality-based security more generally as an insurance-linked 
security (ILS).  The unhedged reinsurer has a stock value Su.  If there is insolvency risk 
in the event of a pandemic then let the state δ be implicitly defined by .  The 
unhedged stock value may then be expressed as 
(a, ) 0Π δ =
 
{ }uS (a) max 0, (a, ) dP( )
(a, )dP( )
Ω
ζ
δ
= Π ω ω
= Π ω ω
∫
∫
 (2) 
Observe that the reinsurer selects the underwriting effort to maximize the current 
shareholder value.  The first order condition is 
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( )
( )
u
u
1
1
dS D a , dP( )
da
1 D L(a, ) dP( )
0
ζ
δ
ζ
δ
= Π ω ω
= − − ω ω
=
∫
∫ 6 (3) 
Equation (3) implicitly defines the optimal underwriting activity au.  The underwriting 
effort by the reinsurer is assumed to reduce the brevity risk.  This assumption is 
formalized in the following: 
Assumption One.  The reinsurer’s payoff L(a, )ω  satisfies the principle of decreasing 
uncertainty (PDU) and the PDU is defined by the following derivative properties: D2L < 0 
and D12L > 0.7
After compensating for the change in the mean, the PDU provides a decrease in the risk 
of the payoff in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970; MacMinn and 
Holtmann 1983).   
Next, consider the second order condition.  Observe that 
 ( ) ( )ζδ δ= Π ω ω − Π δ δ <∫2 u u u11 12d S dD a , dP( ) D a , p( ) dada 0  (4) 
The concavity of Π or equivalently the convexity of L suffices to make the first term on 
the right hand side of (4) negative.  The PDU suffices to show that Π δ >uD (a , ) 01  and  
 
u
1
u
2
D (a , )d 0
da D (a , )
Π δδ = − Π δ <
e
                                                     
 (5) 
Hence, the second order condition holds if the second term on the RHS of (4) is less than 
the first.  It may also be noted that the second order condition reduces to just the first 
term in the absence of insolvency risk and so the concavity of the payoff suffices to show 
that the condition holds.  We will assume that the second order condition is satisfied in 
the remaining analysis. 
It is useful to compare the underwriting decisions of the firms with and without 
insolvency risk.  Recall that Shavell (Shavell 1986) has described the situation in which 
an insurer does not possess the resources to cover all losses with certainty as the 
judgment proof problem.  The insurer facing the judgment proof problem does not have 
the incentive to select the socially efficient level of care as noted in the following claim 
and proof.  Let a denote the level of care or equivalently the underwriting choice made 
by the reinsurer with no insolvency risk.8
6 D1Π is standard notation for the partial derivative of the function Π with respect to its first argument.  
Similarly D12Π is standard notation for the partial derivative of the function D2Π with respect to its first 
argument. 
7 See MacMinn and Holtmann 1983 for a description of this principle.  It is a mirror image of the principle of 
increasing uncertainty introduced by Leland, i.e., see Leland, H. (1972). "Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain 
Demand." American Economic Review 62: 278-91. 
8 The socially efficient care is that level that maximizes the value for all stakeholders in the enterprise and so 
can also be described in situations with insolvency risk as well.  Equation (6) would still apply. 
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Claim: The level of care selected by the reinsurer is greater in the absence of insolvency 
risk, i.e.,  
Proof.  In the absence of insolvency risk the value is Se where 
 
ζ= Π ω ω∫e 0S (a) (a, )dP( )  (6) 
and the first order condition for a socially optimal level of care is 
 (
e
e
10
e
10
dS D (a , )dP( )
da
( ) 1 D L(a , ) dP( )
0
ζ
ζ
= Π ω ω
)= Γ ω − − ω ω
=
∫
∫  (7) 
Hence, the claim follows by noting that 
 
ζ ζ
δ
=
δ
− = Π ω ω − Π ω ω
= Π ω ω
>
∫ ∫
∫
u
e u
u u
1 10
a a
u
10
dS dS D (a , )dP( ) D (a , )dP( )
da da
D (a , )dP( )
0
 (8) 
 
follows by the PDU since  is positive and Π δu1D (a , ) Π <12D 0
ω ≤ δ
 yields  for all 
.  QED 
Π ω >u1D (a , ) 0
It may also be noted that the social optimum noted in equation (7) is, with appropriate 
discounting, equivalent to the optimum noted in the literature by (Shavell 1986; Kahan 
1989; MacMinn 2002).  The social optimum is the level of care such that the present value 
of the marginal benefit equals that of the marginal cost, as seen in the following rewrite 
of equation (7) 
 
( )ζ
ζ
= − ω − ω
ζ= − ω ω −
=
∫
∫
e
e
10
e
10
dS D L(a , ) 1 dP( )
da
D L(a , )dP( ) dP( )
0
ω∫0  (9) 
The first term on the RHS of the second equality is the marginal benefit or equivalently 
the present value of the marginal loss reduction and the second term is the marginal cost 
or equivalently the present value of the last dollar spent on care. 
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Triggers and Incentives 
Next, consider the introduction of insurance-linked securities.  The first case considered 
here is that of a mortality-based bond issued by an SPE.  The instrument is designed to 
pay the reinsurer in the event of mortality surprise, e.g., if the mortality rate is 130% or 
more of what had been projected.  Such an instrument may be constructed with an 
indemnity, index or parametric trigger.  In the indemnity case the payoff from the 
perspective of the reinsurer would be an option payoff like max{0, L(a, ω) – i} where i is 
the strike price.  In the second case of an index trigger the payoff from the perspective of 
the reinsurer would be max{0, I(ω) - i} where I(ω) is the loss index.   
 
Indemnity trigger 
The indemnity trigger case of an insurance-linked security costs Cm dollars now where Cm 
is the call option price for the coverage.  Then 
 
{ }
( )
Ω
γ
= ω
= ω −
∫
∫
m
0
C (a,i) max 0,L(a, ) i dP
L(a, ) i dP
−
 (10) 
where γ is the boundary of the option’s in the money event as shown in figure one.9   
 
The stock value now of the corporation with this ILS is 
 
{ }{ }
{ }( )
Ω
ζ
α
= Π ω + ω −
= Π ω + ω −
∫
∫
mS (a,i) max 0, (a, ) max 0,L(a, ) i dP
(a, ) max 0,L(a, ) i dP
 (11) 
where α is the boundary of the insolvency event as shown in figure 1(b).  Finally the 
current shareholder value is Smo
                                                     
9 The payoffs in the figures will be represented as linear only due to the authors’ limited drawing ability; the 
analysis does not depend on the linear functions represented in the figures.  
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moS
uo
ma (i)
  (12) ( ) { }( )
( ) ( )( )
mo m m
0
0
S (a,i) C (a,i) S (a,i)
L(a, ) i dP (a, ) max 0,L(a, ) i dP
L(a, ) i dP ( ) a L a, dP
γ ζ
α
α ζ
α
= − +
= − ω − + Π ω + ω −
= − ω − + Γ ω − − ω
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
Let denote the current shareholder value in the unhedged case with no insolvency 
risk.  It follows that if the probability of insolvency is zero so that α is zero then 
uoS
(12) 
becomes 
  (13) 
( ) { }( )
mo m m
0 0
0
uo
S (a,i) C (a,i) S (a,i)
L(a, ) i dP (a, ) max 0,L(a, ) i dP
(a, )dP
S (a)
γ ζ
ζ
= − +
= − ω − + Π ω + ω −
= Π ω
=
∫ ∫
∫
and (13) demonstrates that no value is added by the ILS.  This is confirmation of the 
generalized version of the 1958 Modigliani-Miller theorem.  It is achieved with the usual 
ceteris paribus assumption; in this case no change in underwriting care due to the ILS is 
allowed in making the comparison and that assumption will be changed in the 
subsequent analysis.  It may also be noted that the current shareholder value  
diminishes relative to the unhedged current shareholder value S given insolvency risk; 
this is not a real diminution of value but rather a redistribution of value from 
shareholders to policyholders or other stakeholders. 
  (14) 
( )
( )
α ζ ζ
α δ
α δ
α
− = − ω − + Π ω − Π ω ω
= − ω − + Π ω
<
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
mo uo
0
0
S S L(a, ) i dP (a, )dP (a, )dP( )
L(a, ) i dP (a, )dP
0
 
 
Incentive effects of the indemnity trigger 
The ILS with an indemnity trigger will have an impact on the incentive to take care in 
underwriting.  The indemnity trigger has the effect of full loss coverage in some states 
and that in turn impacts the underwriting choice; equivalently, a well known moral 
hazard problem (Shavell 1979) occurs with this form of the ILS.  The relationship 
between the option coverage and the underwriting care will be specified in the function 
where i is the exercise price of the option.  The function am is implicitly defined by 
the first order condition for the stock value expressed in equation (11). 
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mS LdP dP
a a a
L 1 dP dP
a
0
ζ γ
α α
ζ
α
∂ ∂Π ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂
∂⎛ ⎞= − − +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
=
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ La
γ
α
∂  (15) 
Suppose the second order condition for a maximum holds.  Then the function exists 
and its derivative is 
ma (i)
 
2 m
m
2 m
2
S
da a i 0
di S
a
∂
∂ ∂= − ≥∂
∂
 (16) 
if the numerator is non-negative.  To see that the numerator in (16) is non-negative 
observe that 
 
ζ γ
α α
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞= − − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∂ ∂α ∂ ∂α ∂ ∂γ⎛ ⎞= − − − α − α + γ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
∂α ∂ ∂γ= α + γ∂ ∂ ∂
>
∫ ∫2 mS L L1 dP dPa i i a a
L L L1 p( ) p( ) p( )
a i a i a
Lp( ) p( )
i a i
0
∂i
iˆ
ˆi i≥
                                                     
 (17) 
The inequality in (17) follows because α is increasing in i, γ is decreasing in i and L is 
decreasing in a.10  Therefore, the inequality in (16) is a strict inequality and am(i) is 
increasing in the strike price i.   
Figure one and equation (11) are appropriate for some exercise prices but there are two 
more generic cases that must also be included.  First, there is an exercise price  
sufficiently large that α equals δ; for larger i the boundary of the insolvency event 
remains at δ.  For the stock value is that provided in equation (7) and so am(i) is a 
10 Note that α is implicitly defined by the condition ( )(a, ) L(a, ) i 0Π α + α − =  or equivalently by 
 and so ( ) a i 0Γ α − − =
1
0
i ( )
∂α = >′∂ Γ α . 
Similarly, γ is implicitly defined by the condition L(a, ) i 0γ − =  and so 
1
0
Li
∂γ = <∂∂
∂γ
. 
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ˆi i i*
i*
constant on the interval .  Second, there is an exercise price  such that α equals 
zero and so i* eliminates insolvency risk; for i
≥
≤ the stock value is  
  (18) 
( )
( ) ( )
m
0
0
S L i dP dP
a i dP L a dP
γ ζ
γ
γ ζ
γ
= Π + − + Π
= Γ − − + Γ − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
and again it is apparent that am(i) is a constant on the interval i ≤ i*; i* may but need not 
be as small as zero11 but at i = 0 the care decision clearly goes to zero as shown in figure 
two.  The results are collected in figure two.  Note that am(i) is non-decreasing and this is 
confirmation of a moral hazard problem since an increase in the strike price i is 
equivalent to less loss coverage and that generates more care in underwriting but more 
loss coverage generates less care.  The figure also suggests that the indemnity trigger ILS 
cannot provide the incentive for adequate care in underwriting since the maximum care 
is that for the unhedged case.  Clearly, rather than improving or solving the incentive 
problem the introduction of the indemnity hedge aggravates the problem. 
 
 
 
Index trigger 
The index trigger case of an insurance-linked security costs Cb dollars now where Cb is 
the call option price for the coverage.  Then 
  (19) 
{ }
( )
b
0
C (i) max 0,I( ) i dP
I( ) i dP
Ω
η
= ω −
= ω −
∫
∫
where η is the boundary of the in the money or equivalently the exercise event for this 
option as shown in figure three.   
 
                                                     
11 This claim may be justified by direct calculation since γ increases without limit. 
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The stock value of the corporation with this ILS is 
 
{ }{ }
{ }( )
bS (a,i) max 0, (a, ) max 0,I( ) i dP
(a, ) max 0,I( ) i dP
Ω
ζ
β
= Π ω + ω −
= Π ω + ω −
∫
∫
 (20) 
where β is the boundary of the insolvency event as shown in figure 3(b).  The current 
shareholder value in this case is 
  (21) 
( ) { }( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
bo b b
0
0
S (a,i) C (i) S (a,i)
I( ) i dP (a, ) max 0,I( ) i dP
I( ) i dP ( ) a I( ) L(a, ) i dP
( ) a L(a, ) dP
η ζ
β
η η
β
ζ
η
= − +
= − ω − + Π ω + ω −
= − ω − + Γ ω − + ω − ω −
+ Γ ω − − ω
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫
Note that the second term on the RHS of the third equality includes the basis risk (I – L).  
The connection with the generalized 1958 Modigliani-Miller theorem can be made here as 
in the last case when the insolvency risk is zero. 
 
Incentive effects of the index trigger 
The ILS with an index trigger will have an impact on incentive to take care in 
underwriting.  Unlike the indemnity trigger, this instrument does not generate a moral 
hazard problem but it does generate basis risk.  The relationship between the option 
coverage and the underwriting care will be specified in the function ab(i) where i is the 
exercise price of the option.  The function ab is implicitly defined by the first order 
condition for equation (20) 
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bS dP
a a
L 1 dP
a
0
ζ
β
ζ
β
∂ ∂Π=∂ ∂
∂⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
=
∫
∫  (22) 
Suppose the second order condition for a maximum holds.  Then the function ab(i) exists 
and its derivative is 
 
2 b
b
2 b
2
S
da a i 0
di S
a
∂
∂ ∂= − ≤∂
∂
 (23) 
if the numerator non-positive.  Suppose that ( )I L 0∂ ∂ω − ∂ ∂ω > so that the corporate loss 
distribution has more weight in its tails.  Then observe that 
 
2 bS L 1 dP
a i i a
L 1 p( )
a i
0
ζ
β
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∂ ∂β⎛ ⎞= − − − β⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
<
∫
 (24) 
The inequality follows because β is an increasing function of i and by the PDU the term in 
parentheses is positive at β.12  The inequality in (24) yields a care function ab(i) that is 
decreasing in i. 
Figure three and equation (20) are appropriate for some exercise prices but again there 
are two more generic cases that must also be included.  First, there is an exercise price i  
sufficiently large that β equals δ; for larger i the boundary of the insolvency event 
remains at δ.  For i the stock value is that provided in equation i b≥ (2) and so is a 
constant on the interval 
a (i)
i .  Second, if there is an exercise price i i≥ •  such that β equals 
zero then  eliminates insolvency risk; for i• i i•≤ the stock value is  
                                                     
12Note that α is implicitly defined by the condition ( )(a, ) I( ) i 0Π β + β − =  or equivalently by 
 and so ( )( ) a L(a, ) I( ) i 0Γ β − − β − β − =
1
0
I Li
∂β = >∂ ∂∂ −∂β ∂β
. 
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)
  (25) 
( )
( ) (
b
0
0
S I i dP dP
a (I L) i dP L a dP
γ ζ
γ
γ ζ
γ
= Π + − + Π
= Γ − + − − + Γ − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
and again it is apparent that ab(i) is a constant on the interval i i•≤  if an  exists which 
makes β = 0.  If such an  exists then below that threshold the care becomes the socially 
efficient choice as the following derivative shows 
i•
i•
 
b
0
0
S L L1 dP 1 dP
a a a
L 1 dP
a
0
γ ζ
γ
ζ
∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∂⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
=
∫ ∫
∫  (26) 
since (26) is equivalent to (7).  The results are collected in figure four.  Note that is 
non-increasing and this is confirmation that the moral hazard problem can be eliminated 
and the incentive distortions due to insolvency risk can be mitigated or eliminated.   
ba (i)
  
i
Figure 4
au am(i)
i• i* i i
- ^
 
The analysis shows that the index trigger dominates the indemnity trigger in the sense 
that it reduces the insolvency without creating an incentive problem; the indemnity 
trigger, on the other hand, reduces the insolvency risk but engenders an incentive that 
tends to increase the insolvency risk.  The dominance is investigated in the next section 
by comparing current shareholder values. 
 
Comparison of Current Shareholder Values 
The analysis shows that the insurance-linked security with an index trigger can under 
certain conditions provide the corporate manager, ceteris paribus, with the incentive to 
take additional care as the level of protection is increased.  The security with an 
indemnity trigger, however, does not align incentives and in fact an additional protection 
provides the corporate manager, ceteris paribus, with an incentive to reduce rather than 
increase care.  Indeed, in the case of the indemnity trigger the care level taken by an 
unhedged firm provides an upper bound on the care that the manager with this 
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moS
instrument will take.  Still, the two triggers provide different current shareholder values 
first because of the difference in the cost of the protection and second because of the 
difference in incentive effects.   
The goal of this section, therefore, is to compare the current shareholder values with the 
index versus the indemnity trigger, taking into account the incentives associated with 
these instruments.  Thus we will compare  evaluated at ( )ma (i),i boS
ba (i),i
)
 and  evaluated 
at ( ) . 
First note that from (21), the current shareholder value in the case of index trigger for a 
given (a, i) may be rewritten as follows: 
  (27) ( ) ( )bo
0
S (a,i) I( ) i dP ( ) a L(a, ) dP
β ζ
β= − ω − + Γ ω − − ω∫ ∫
Second from (12), the current shareholder value in the case of the indemnity trigger for a 
given (a, i) may be expressed as follows: 
  (28) ( ) ( )(mo 0S (a,i) L(a, ) i dP ( ) a L a, dPα ζα= − ω − + Γ ω − − ω∫ ∫
Consider the difference in current shareholder value at the same care and protection 
level for the standard case in which β > α
(
. 
  (29) 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
bo mo
0 0
0
0
S (a,i) S (a,i) L(a, ) i dP I( ) i dP
( ) a L a, dP ( ) a L a, dP
L I dP I i dP a L dP
L I dP a L I i dP
0
α β
ζ ζ
β α
α β β
α α
α β
α
⎡ ⎤− = ω − − ω −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ Γ ω − − ω − Γ ω − − ω⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
= − − − − Γ − −
= − − Γ − − − −
>
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
The inequality in (29) follows since L > I for states in the insolvency event ω ≤  and 
because the second term on the right hand side of the third equality is negative for all 
α
),ω∈ α β ; to see that the second term on the right hand side of the third equality is 
negative recall that the boundary β of the insolvency event is implicitly defined by the 
condition ( )( ) a L(a, ) I( ) i 0Γ β − − β − β − = .  Hence, ( )( ) a L(a, ) I( ) iΓ ω − − ω − ω −  increasing in 
ω and zero at β suffices to show that this integral is negative. 
Next, observe that from the inequality in (29) it follows that ( ) (bo b mo mS a (i),i S a (i),i> )
moS ba m moS
 if 
decreases as a is reduced from  to a ; equivalently, this is the case if  is 
increasing in a.  Hence, observe that 
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
m
mo
1 10
a a
1 10
10 0
S D LdP L(a, ) i p( ) 1 D L dP
a a
( ) a L(a, ) p( )
a
D LdP 1 D L dP ( ) a i p( )
a
dP 1 D L dP
0
α ζ
α
=
α ζ
α
α ζ
∂ ∂α= − − α − α + − −∂ ∂
∂α− Γ α − − α α ∂
∂α= − + − − − Γ α − − α ∂
= + − −
>
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 (30) 
The third equality follows by noting that α is implicitly defined by the condition 
= 0.  The inequality follows by noting that a( ) a iΓ α − − m ea<  and so the second term on 
the right hand side of the third equality is positive.  Therefore, we have the current 
shareholder value larger for the index trigger than the indemnity trigger, i.e., 
. ( )bo bS a (i),i ( )mo mS a (i),i>
 
Concluding Remarks 
The analysis begins by noting that insolvency risk in conjunction with limited liability 
creates an incentive problem known as the judgment proof problem.  The manager of a 
publicly held and traded (re)insurance corporate represents the stockholders interest and 
the judgment proof problem puts those interests in conflict with those of other 
stakeholders.  Not surprisingly we show that such a manager selects a level of care less 
than the socially efficient level.  The conflict of interest described here also generates an 
underinvestment problem; while not our focus, that problem does motivate the analysis of 
some new capital market instruments that have been designed to manage (re)insurer 
insolvency risk.  The new capital market instruments considered here are similar to the 
CAT bonds discussed in the literature in the sense that they may be designed with 
triggers that are either indemnity or index based so that the options attached to the 
bonds are in the money if the reinsurer suffers a sufficiently large loss or if the index of 
losses, i.e., mortality, is sufficiently large.  We study the incentive effects associated with 
each instrument and show that the index based instrument dominates the indemnity 
based instrument in the sense that it reduces insolvency risk and provides the corporate 
manager with the incentive to take more rather than less care.  We go on to show that, 
given the same strike price, the current shareholder value of the index based instrument 
exceeds that of the indemnity based instrument. 
There is a growing literature that is concerned with hedging longevity risk, i.e., the risk 
of out living ones wealth, e.g., see (MacMinn, Brockett and Blake 2006).  For further 
research we note that to date there has been no similar comparison of mortality-based 
securities to hedge excessive mortality changes for annuity books of business; such 
mortality-based securities would, of course, be designed to cover excessive mortality 
changes in the opposite direction.  The concern here would be longevity risk, i.e., the risk 
of living too long.  Mortality improvements are being reported; there has been 
acceleration in the mortality improvements at older ages in Sweden (Wilmoth, Deegan, 
Lundstrom and Horiuchi 2000).  There has also been some evidence that genetics plays a 
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major role in the ability to survive to extremely old ages and hence that genetic research 
may yield insights into how to slow the aging process (Strauss 2001).  The mortality 
improvements do yield correlated risks for insurers with life annuity books.  To the extent 
that the improvements can be predicted accurately over the horizon of the life annuities, 
the longevity risk can be managed by insurers with the standard tools.  Life annuities, 
however, have tails that are quite long and so although the mortality improvements may 
seem less surprising, the correlated risks are just as problematic.   
Survivor bonds (Blake and Burrows 2001) have been suggested as an effective means of 
managing longevity risk.  The survivor bond is essentially a reverse tontine; the bond 
pays a coupon that is proportional to the number of survivors in a cohort.  A basis risk 
problem might remain depending on how the cohort is structured.  An instrument similar 
to that issued by Swiss Re for brevity risk could also be structured for longevity risk.  The 
Swiss Re instrument is in the money if the mortality rate becomes too large but one could 
also write a security that would be in the money if the mortality rate became too small. 
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